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Abstract. We argue that the appraisal of models in social epistemology 
requires conceiving of them as argumentative devices, taking into account 
the argumentative context and adopting a family-of-models perspective. We 
draw up such an account and show how it makes it easier to see the value 
and limits of the use of models in social epistemology. To illustrate our 
points, we document and explicate the argumentative role of epistemic 
landscape models in social epistemology and highlight their limitations. We 
also claim that our account could be fruitfully used in appraising other 
models in philosophy and science.  
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1. Introduction 
Philosophers employ a wide variety of argumentative resources to support their 
claims, including appeals to intuition, authoritative testimony, common sense, case 
studies, formal derivations and even experiments. The usefulness of these resources 
must be evaluated with respect to their contribution to the strength of a 
philosophical argument. In the present paper we suggest that the same principle 
applies to the use of mathematical and computational models in philosophy. We 
argue that to understand the value – and limits – of models in social epistemology, 
one needs to analyse them in the context of the arguments they are used to support.  
We further argue that models in social epistemology function as argumentative 
devices. When philosophers build and use mathematical and computational models, 
their conclusions often go beyond what can be supported by the premises of their 
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model. Models are often used to support a broader philosophical claim, and the 
model functions as one of the many premises of the argument. Thus, even if one 
conceives of a model as an argument in itself (Beisbart 2012), there may well be a 
gap between what it can establish (i.e., the model argument) by itself and what the 
philosopher wants to conclude (i.e., the philosophical argument). This gap is filled 
with argumentative steps, many of which remain implicit. It is crucial to understand 
these steps to make sense of how models are used in philosophical argumentation. 
Our aim in this paper is to make sense of the functioning of models in this context. 
Using epistemic landscape (EL) models in social epistemology as our example, we 
illustrate how an EL model operates in a philosophical argument. As we will show, 
being explicit about the several steps involved helps in terms of seeing through the 
argument and assessing its strengths and weaknesses. 
Second, we describe how changes introduced into an existing model could be 
understood as argumentative moves. Philosophers who use models present their 
arguments in the context of existing arguments, as amendments, criticisms or 
plausible alternatives. It is necessary to understand this argumentative context to 
make sense of the model’s contribution. Taking into account this broader context 
shows how the success of a model (or a modelling framework) does not depend 
solely on its intrinsic properties. The epistemic contribution of a model typically 
becomes clear after a collective process of modifying, reinterpreting and criticising 
the model and its suggested implications. For example, as we will show, not only 
did Weisberg and Muldoon’s (2009) epistemic landscape model suffer from 
deficiencies such as a lack of representational adequacy and derivational robustness2, 
it also contained programming errors. Nevertheless, it became one of the most well-
known models in social epistemology. If one ignores the dynamics of the later 
dispute and collaboration, it is hard to understand its success. More importantly, 
taking the broader argumentative context into account sheds light on how the 
meaning and value of a model may be established long after its original publication. 
Like many other models in social epistemology (e.g., Kitcher 1990, 1993; Strevens 
2003, Hegselman & Krause 2009), EL models are highly idealised and sensitive (i.e., 
not robust) to changes in their structural assumptions or parameters. Until now, 
most of the discussion on the value of EL models has focused mainly on the model-
target dyad (to use Knuuttila’s term, 2009) and robustness. We suggest that such a 
perspective does not suffice, and argue that to see the value and limits of EL models 
one must take into account the fact that they function as argumentative devices. The 
representational adequacy of a model can only be evaluated if one understands the 
argumentative goals it is intended to serve, and knowledge of its robustness may 
well only emerge over time as others modify the assumptions and the 
implementation of the original model. Furthermore, one can assess the credibility 
of a model without engaging in a pairwise model-target comparison – which would 
be very difficult in the case of highly abstract models – by making piecemeal 
 
2  In the present paper, we use ‘robustness’ to indicate ‘derivational robustness’, which 
concerns the sensitivity of a model’s results to the alterations of its assumptions (Woodward 
2006). In Section 5, we briefly discuss how derivational robustness analysis relates to a 
broader notion of robustness.  
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assessments of the plausibility of individual assumptions relative to the 
argumentative goals.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we briefly introduce the 
Weisberg-Muldoon model and show that a lack of representational adequacy and 
robustness are the two main concerns about the use of abstract models in social 
epistemology. These are reasonable concerns. We argue, however, that focusing 
solely on representation and robustness is not appropriate because it does not take 
the argumentative goals and context into account. We also suggest that 
consideration of the argumentative context, goals and moves elucidates the intended 
and actual contribution of a model. Section 3 outlines our account of models as 
argumentative devices. We claim that understanding how a model is used in a 
philosophical argument requires disentangling several layers of argumentation. By 
way of illustration, in Section 3.1 we disentangle three such layers--the philosophical 
argument, the conceptual model and the computational model--in Weisberg and 
Muldoon's (2009) argument and show how their main conclusions are supported. 
In Section 3.2 we examine their argument in detail, discuss how the credibility of 
the model can be assessed, and illustrate the gaps and problems in their 
argumentation. We further argue that to grasp the value-added of an abstract 
philosophical model, one must question how it supports claims about difference 
making. We discuss how difference making can be established and introduce the 
idea that epistemic benefits from modelling are commonly realised as a consequence 
of several modelling attempts.  
With a view to analysing how the process of collective exploration ultimately 
determines the value of a model, in Section 4 we introduce the notions of 
argumentative goal and argumentative move. To illustrate the usefulness of these 
notions and our approach, we discuss what we call first- and second-generation EL 
models. In Section 5, we broaden our view from individual models to model families 
to show that such a perspective provides a better understanding of how EL models 
establish difference makers, and how the discovery of both robust and non-robust 
results might serve useful purposes. We also show how the argumentative force of 
the Weisberg-Muldoon model gradually emerges in the collective work of people 
who refined, criticised and explored the EL framework. Finally, we argue that 
analysing a model (e.g., the Weisberg-Muldoon model) in isolation from the 
argumentative context and other related models cannot encapsulate the 
understanding created by this family of models. The final section of the paper 
presents our concluding observations. 
2. The research topic as an epistemic landscape 
Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) developed an agent-based model of a population of 
scientists to argue for the epistemic usefulness of cognitive diversity in scientific 
communities. Adapting a biological modelling paradigm introduced by Wright 
(1932), the model portrays scientists as agents foraging on a landscape that stands 
for a scientific research topic. Each patch on the landscape represents a particular 
research approach, and the elevation of the patch corresponds to the epistemic 
significance of the approach. The population of agents faces the task of finding 
PREPRINT. February 2020 
Forthcoming in Synthese https://www.springer.com/journal/11229 
 4 
approaches of non-zero epistemic significance. There are three kinds of agents: 
controls, followers and mavericks. Controls do not pay attention to which 
approaches have been adopted by others; followers have a conservative research 
strategy and tend to adopt already tried-out research approaches; and mavericks 
prefer to explore new approaches. Having examined populations of agents 
consisting of different mixes of the three kinds, Weisberg and Muldoon suggest that 
the existence of mavericks in a population enhances its capacity for making 
epistemic progress. They contend that maverick agents act as pathbreakers who help 
follower agents to find research approaches of high epistemic significance. One 
striking outcome of the model is that best epistemic performance is achieved by a 
scientific community consisting solely of maverick agents. 
The Weisberg-Muldoon model has been followed by a series of models inspired by 
the original (see Reijula & Kuorikoski 2019 for a review). However, further scrutiny 
revealed a number of shortcomings in Weisberg and Muldoon’s model that shed 
doubt on its epistemic value. For example, Alexander et al. (2015) showed that 
Weisberg and Muldoon’s conclusions were undermined by an implementation error. 
Correcting this error and adding a slight cost of exploration to the model leads to a 
situation in which the best epistemic performance is no longer achieved by a 100-
percent maverick population, it is achieved by a polymorphic population (Pöyhönen 
2017). The model has also been criticised on various other grounds. Thoma (2015), 
for example, showed that alternative search rules that appear to be just as compatible 
with the behaviour of real scientists as those suggested by Weisberg and Muldoon 
lead to clearly different collective outcomes. Furthermore, the model’s depiction of 
an epistemic landscape has been criticised as being too simple to capture actual 
scientific-research domains (Alexander et al. 2015; Pöyhönen 2017). Martini and 
Pinto (2017) question the epistemic value of models of the social organisation of 
science, including the Weisberg-Muldoon model, because their representational 
adequacy is not empirically established. Finally, explorations of the model show that 
its results are not robust (Thoma 2015, Alexander et al. 2015; Reijula & Kuorikoski 
2019; Pöyhönen 2017, Pinto & Pinto 2018). In sum, the main concerns about the 
Weisberg-Muldoon model are the following: conceptual problems and errors, a lack 
of representational adequacy and non-robustness. 
These concerns reflect more general worries about the use of models in social 
epistemology. Bedessem (2019, p.3) argues that models of the division of cognitive 
labour suffer from a “fundamental lack of clarity about the exact object which is 
divided”, and an ambiguity about what the division of labour is in reality. He also 
questions the representational adequacy of models in social epistemology because 
they ignore essential components of scientific practice and progress: in ignoring the 
fact that scientific fields are hierarchical and interconnected complexes, such models 
overlook the context dependency of epistemic benefits deriving from cognitive 
diversity and pluralism. Rosenstock et al. (2017) argue in their analysis of epistemic 
network models that because most of them are not representationally adequate, 
what they reveal about real epistemic networks is limited: 
“We do not have a good sense of which real world communities 
are well represented by which epistemic network models. This is 
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because these models are highly simplified. They abstract away 
from many relevant details of such communities.” (Rosenstock 
et al. 2017, p.250) 
Thicke (2019) puts representational adequacy at the centre of his analysis of the 
epistemic value of formal models of science and expresses his concerns about their 
theoretical and predictive value. He argues that “the plausibility established by most 
formal models of science is very weak; while there might be some similarities 
between the organization of scientific communities and the structure of these 
models, it is often a very distant sort of similarity” (Thicke 2019, p.17). Thicke’s 
other concern, robustness, is also shared by other authors (e.g., Rosenstock et al. 
2017; Frey & Šešelja 2018). 
“When epistemic network effects are highly robust, it makes 
sense to take them more seriously as important findings for real 
world communities.” (Rosenstock et al. 2017, 250) 
Philosophers of science tend to use representational adequacy and robustness to 
evaluate the epistemic value of a model. The intuitions behind these criteria are 
straightforward. First, although philosophers do not agree on what exactly 
representational adequacy is, they do generally agree that to be able to establish a 
link between the model and its target, some form of similarity or structural mapping 
(e.g., isomorphism, homomorphism) or resemblance between the two is needed. In 
its most common formulation, the requirement is that an epistemically valuable 
model must be similar to its target in relevant respects and to a sufficient degree, 
given its intended use (Giere 1988, 1999, 2004; Mäki 2010, 2011). Second, the 
robustness requirement states that if a model is very sensitive to changes in its 
seemingly trivial (e.g., tractability) assumptions, its results could be artefacts of these 
assumptions. Consequently, one cannot confidently carry the lessons learned from 
a non-robust model to the real world (e.g., Weisberg 2006; Kuorikoski, Lehtinen & 
Marchionni 2010). 
Such concerns about the use of abstract models in philosophy are reasonable. 
Nevertheless, judgements concerning representational adequacy and robustness are 
not easy to make. First, it is not enough to compare a model with its target to 
evaluate its representational adequacy. Considerations of representational adequacy 
in the literature cited above focus on pairwise model-target comparisons and isolate 
the evaluation of a model’s epistemic value from its intended uses. However, models 
are used to serve a diverse set of modelling goals (see e.g., Pielou, 1981; Wimsatt, 
1987; Odenbaugh, 2005), and their representational adequacy can only be judged 
relative to the intended use. This point is, we hope, uncontroversial. 
Representational accounts of models frequently explicitly mention the importance 
of the modelling goals (e.g., Giere 1988, 1999, 2004; Weisberg 2013); nevertheless, 
the unit of their analysis remains the relation between a model and its target, or the 
model-target dyad (Knuuttila 2009). That is, representational accounts of models 
focus on how to provide an account of representational adequacy based on 
measures such as similarity and resemblance, but provide no guidance on how to 
take the modelling goals into account. 
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Second, model-target comparisons are far from straightforward in the case of 
abstract, theoretically motivated models such as EL models, which depict highly 
simplified situations that do not correspond to any empirically observable system. 
Furthermore, there is no simple metric for assessing the “realisticness” of a model’s 
assumptions. Hence, the evaluation of its plausibility is more complicated than is 
usually assumed.  
Third, merely focusing on the similarity between a model and its target also leaves 
out the context and the model’s relation to other models. This goes against the usual 
scientific practice of considering the added value of a model in the broader context 
of other – often competing – models, explanations and theories (Ylikoski and 
Aydinonat 2014). Robustness considerations provide only a partial solution to the 
problem: robustness analysis only requires focusing on a set of closely related 
models and overlooks the relevance of the broader range and the context. In sum, 
merely focusing on pairwise model-target comparisons and robustness leaves out 
two crucial elements that would help to make sense of the value and limits of 
models: modelling goals and the context.3  
If one is to understand the function, value, and limits of a model, one needs to 
evaluate it relative to its purpose. In the case of philosophical models, the typical 
goal of the modelling is to support a philosophical argument that is embedded in 
the context of earlier philosophical arguments and debates.4 Overlooking this goal 
severely hinders their proper assessment. Thus, the best way to understand the 
contribution of models in social epistemology, and in philosophy more generally, is 
to begin from the argumentative goals of the modellers, and to take into account 
the argumentative context in their evaluation. From this perspective the model is 
not, in itself, the argument, it is merely a part of it. In other words, the philosophical 
argument makes use of the model. To understand such use, one has to reconstruct 
the argumentative context, which includes not only the intentions and assumptions 
of the model user, but also the arguments presented in the existing philosophical 
debate. The latter could also include models introduced in earlier phases of the 
discussion. 
Let us consider Weisberg and Muldoon’s model again. They start their paper with 
an observation about the role and importance of the division of cognitive labour in 
science: 
 
3  We do not claim that all earlier accounts of the use of models in social epistemology ignore 
modelling goals. For example, Thickie (2019) and Martini & Pinto (2017) explicitly discuss 
the goals of particular models. However, we introduce a broader conception of the goals and 
context of modelling and provide an account and a detailed analysis of why and how 
argumentative goals and context matters. 
4  Here we understand the notion of argument broadly. An argument “is a sequence of 
statements where all but one of the statements (the premises) are intended to provide 
evidence, or support, for the remaining statement (the conclusion)" (Cook 2009, p. 15). 
Philosophical arguments are thus arguments that present conclusions concerning a 
philosophical topic. Note that this definition allows for both deductive and non-deductive 
arguments.  
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“While these facts about the nature of contemporary science are 
well-known to philosophers, having been discussed by Kuhn and 
Lakatos, among others, surprisingly little has been written about 
the epistemology of divided cognitive labor and the strategies 
scientists do and should use in order to divide their labor 
sensibly” (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009, 226) 
Here they present the broader context of their argument. They also make it clear 
that the more immediate context includes earlier philosophical models introduced 
by Kitcher (1990, 1993) and Strevens (2003) as well as the philosophical arguments 
they support. While expressing their agreement with the general philosophical 
conclusions derived from these models, Weisberg and Muldoon highlight an 
unexplored aspect of the division of labour within this context. They develop a 
model focusing on what happens when scientists in a population adopt different 
research strategies. Although they acknowledge the highly idealised nature of their 
model and the lack of robustness checks (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009, p. 250), they 
nevertheless argue that it is possible to “draw some tentative conclusions about 
division of cognitive labor” (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009, p. 250). They also claim, 
on the basis of some additional assumptions as we will show: 
“A polymorphic population of research strategies thus seems to 
be the optimal way to divide cognitive labor” (Weisberg and 
Muldoon 2009, p. 251)  
This is the conclusion of their model-based philosophical argument, albeit a 
tentative one. In sum, Weisberg and Muldoon use their model to contribute to a 
debate concerning the division of cognitive labour (the argumentative context). 
Understanding how the model functions as part of their philosophical argument is 
the key to understanding its value and limits. A model may have various roles in an 
argument. Among other things, models serve as representations of empirical targets, 
proof of conceptual possibility, formalised thought experiments and mere 
illustrations. Thus, the representational adequacy or robustness of a model cannot 
be assessed independently of the role it is supposed to play in an argument. For 
example, if the purpose is to support a claim about a conceptual possibility or to 
explore possibilities, a highly idealized model might suffice. If the purpose is to 
illustrate the sensitivity of a certain result to certain assumptions, a more complex, 
non-robust model could do the job.5  Seeing models as argumentative devices helps 
in putting their functions into context. What a model does is not its intrinsic feature: 
it depends on how it is used and what it is used for. Is it used to establish some new 
claim in the debate, or is the purpose to strengthen or weaken an existing claim? Is 
 
5  As an example of highly idealized modelling in social epistemology, consider the opinion-
dynamics model by Hegselman & Krause (2009). In order to focus on general features of 
truth seeking and opinion aggregation – not on any particular target system – the authors 
adopt what they call a low-resolution modelling approach that abstracts away from detail, and only 
retains a few key properties of judgment formation and deliberative social exchange. As an 
example of how the use of a more complex model could help philosophers make their point 
see Frey & Šešelja (2019), who use their model to argue that simplicity of agent-based models 
may have a price. 
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it used to examine the generality of a claim, or to demonstrate the irrelevance of 
certain considerations for the claim? Identifying the argumentative goal and the 
argumentative modelling moves (see Section 4) that support it helps the reader to 
determine the intended contribution of a model.  
The argumentative context is also relevant in establishing the model’s actual 
contribution, which might turn out to be different from what was intended. The 
identification of the original intentions of the modeller is of course valuable in 
assessing whether the model succeeds in satisfying the modeller’s goals. However, 
it is rarely sufficient in understanding the value of a model. An understanding of 
what the model is good for tends to emerge over time, after careful consideration 
by other participants in the debate. Thus, the original model, or its presentation 
alone, could be misleading as a source for estimating its ultimate value (or lack of 
it). A mere focus on the modeller’s intentions overlooks how the model is used in 
argumentation, which is critical to seeing the flaws in model-based arguments. The 
argumentative context is decisive, because it helps to shed light not only on what a 
philosopher wants to do with a model, but also on what the model actually 
contributes to the debate. This is one reason why philosophers who have expressed 
their concerns about the Weisberg-Muldoon model and the use of models in social 
epistemology in general have sometimes missed the point: they have merely focused 
on the properties of a given model instead of considering more carefully how a 
family of related models could contribute to a broader inquiry. 
3. EL models in the service of social epistemology  
The success of a philosophical argument depends on the strength of the link 
between the premises and the conclusion. As we stated above, in a model-based 
argument the premises will cite at least one model. We do not specify how the model 
is used to support an argument, or how it is used to formulate the premises, because 
this depends on how the philosopher chooses to use it. In the case of EL models, 
the model used is a computational one: a computer program that implements a 
conceptual model, which, in turn, is used to support an argument. To understand 
how EL models function as argumentative devices it is useful to clearly disentangle 
between these three different layers of the process. As we will show, both modelling 
layers introduce potential “soft spots” in the argumentation that might be difficult 
to identify. We will also show where such soft spots reside in EL models, and how 
they should be taken into account when the strength of the overall argument is 
assessed.  
In this section we first introduce the different layers of argumentation, then we show 
how they can be used in appraisals of the argument, and in conclusion we discuss 
an important function of models in philosophical argumentation: establishing 
difference makers. 
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3.1. The structure of Weisberg and Muldoon’s argument  
 
Figure 1. Argument and the layers of modelling 
Philosophers employ several kinds of devices in support of their arguments, such as 
formal derivations, thought experiments, case studies and even common-sense 
reflection. Models could be considered one of the elements in their toolbox. Both 
mathematical models (e.g., Kitcher 1990, 1993; Strevens 2003) and computer 
simulations (e.g., Weisberg and Muldoon 2009, Pöyhönen 2016, Zollman 2007) 
have been used as such argumentative devices.  
As we noted above, in the case of computer simulations, two distinct layers of 
modelling should be distinguished: the conceptual model and the computational 
model. A conceptual model is typically presented in a research paper, although some 
of its details might remain implicit. Weisberg and Muldoon’s EL model suggests 
how the central notions in a general argument, such as cognitive diversity and the division 
of labour, can be made precise. The constructs of the research approach and the different 
learning strategies of agents, as well as the measures of collective epistemic 
performance (e.g., epistemic progress) are examples of conceptual-model 
operationalizations of the general notions of interest.  
In addition, the conceptual model serves as a blueprint for the computational model, 
meaning the implementation of the model in a computer program. In principle, the 
computational model could be considered a deductive device that takes the 
modelling assumptions as input and produces the modelling results as output 
(Beisbart 2012). It should be borne in mind, however, that even if the computational 
model is conceived of or reconstructed as a deductively valid argument, this does 
not imply that the philosophical argument in question is also deductively valid. The 
model typically supports only part of the reasoning involved in the philosophical 
argument. 
Now let us consider Weisberg and Muldoon’s philosophical argument for the 
following tentative conclusion: the optimal division of labour could be achieved with 
a polymorphic population of research strategies. How do they support this 
conclusion? They do so by means of results obtained from the computational 
implementation of a conceptual model, and two informal assumptions (i.e., 
assumptions that were not explicitly modelled). Let us now trace how Weisberg and 
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Muldoon arrive at this conclusion. In order to simplify the picture, we omit many 
details in our skeletal representation of their argument. 
In setting up their conceptual model (arrow A in Figure 1), Weisberg and Muldoon 
appear to make the following assumptions, among others.6 For the sake of brevity, 
we first present the assumption of the conceptual model and then the 
computational-model analogue of it in parenthesis. 
P1.  A scientific research topic can be represented as a set of research 
approaches (the set of patches comprising the landscape) 
P2.  The epistemic significance of research depends on the research 
approach adopted by the scientist (elevation of the patch) 
P3.  Similar research approaches have comparable epistemic significance 
(smoothness of the landscape) 
P4.  Scientists care about epistemic significance, i.e., about the “significance 
of the truth that is uncovered by employing a given approach” (p. 229) 
(Agents try to find high-elevation patches on the landscape) 
P5.  Scientists can only gradually change their research approach (Agents 
cannot jump over the landscape: they move one patch at a time) 
P6.  Different strategies for changing one’s research approach constitute a 
relevant form of cognitive diversity in a community of scientists (Three 
types of agents - controls, followers and mavericks) 
... 
There is obviously continuity between the conceptual assumptions and the 
assumptions implemented in the computational model. Nevertheless, the 
differences are significant. For example, the assumption that scientists care about 
epistemic significance (conceptual model) differs significantly from the assumption 
that agents try to find high-elevation patches on a landscape (computational model; 
see P4, above). Thus, whether the result of the computational model supports the 
conclusions at the level of the conceptual model turns out to be an important 
question for the appraisal of the philosophical argument. 
Although the assumptions of the conceptual model lay down the basic framework 
of the analysis, it is still too vague to derive precise results. The implementation of 
the conceptual model in a computer program (arrow B in Figure 1) makes the 
derivation possible, but with a slightly different set of assumptions that are taken to 
be an appropriate implementation of those of the conceptual model. Moreover, the 
conceptual model is incomplete in several ways, and it must be accompanied by 
various implementation assumptions (IA) to make the derivation of quantitative 
 
6  Weisberg and Muldoon present some of these assumptions as the “conceptual component[s] of 
epistemic landscapes” (2009, p. 228, emphasis added). 
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modelling results possible. The original EL model, includes such assumptions 
concerning:  
IA1.  The size of the landscape (101x101 grid) 
IA2.  Scheduling (do agents move simultaneously or sequentially) 
IA3.  Time scale, or how long a simulation is allowed to run (max 50,000 
cycles) 
... 
The addition of these implementation assumptions allows the research approaches, 
the significance of the research and the behaviour of scientists to be represented in 
a particular way in the computational model in comparison to the conceptual model 
presented by Weisberg and Muldoon. It is on these premises and assumptions as 
well as the corresponding analysis of the computational model that Weisberg and 
Muldoon (among others) base the following interim conclusions (IC, arrow C in 
Figure 1): 
IC1.  Maverick agents stimulate the problem-solving ability of followers 
(mavericks help followers to hill-climb) 
IC2.  Adding maverick agents to a population of controls and followers 
increases the population’s capacity to make epistemic progress 
(epistemic progress =df proportion of non-zero patches discovered by 
the population at a particular time) 
IC3.  The increased epistemic efficiency of the mixed population of agents 
(IC2) relies on mavericks stimulating the followers to make considerable 
epistemic and total progress (IC1) 
Note that these interim conclusions still do not imply the tentative conclusion in 
Weisberg and Muldoon’s argument (i.e., that an optimal division of labour could be 
achieved with a polymorphic population of research strategies). In an attempt to 
reach this more general conclusion they make an additional informal assumption 
(IN1), which was neither implemented in the computational model nor presented 
with the conceptual model.  
IN1.  “Different strategies have differential costs. In particular, it is more 
costly to be a maverick than a follower.” (p. 250) 
On the basis of their interim conclusions and this informal assumption, they 
conclude (arrow (d)): 
C1.  “A polymorphic population of research strategies thus seems to be the 
optimal way to divide cognitive labor.” (p. 251) 
Furthermore, although not stated in these precise terms, the interim conclusions are 
meant to support the more general philosophical conclusion:  
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C2.  Scientific research requires the beneficial division of cognitive labour, 
which can be brought about by means of cognitive diversity  
As this schematic representation of the argumentative structure indicates, the 
derivation of philosophical conclusions relies on several elements including the 
specification of models (arrows A-B in Figure 1) and interpretations of results 
(arrows C-D in Figure 1). Each step typically introduces new assumptions into the 
process. Hence, the strength of the philosophical argument, as well as the truth and 
relevance of its conclusions, could be contested by challenging the assumptions and 
the argumentative links, as depicted in our schematic presentation. 
3.2. Reappraisal of the argument  
To see if the string of argumentation works, one could start by asking whether the 
models are valid in the sense that their results follow from their assumptions. A 
minimal validity condition for a computational model is that it must be free from 
programming and implementation errors. The process of ascertaining this is referred 
to as verification in the literature on simulation (see Gräbner 2012 and the citations 
therein). 
It is also worth pointing out that in the case of EL models, what are typically called 
modelling results are not the same as output data: they are rather summaries of some 
distribution in the output dataset produced by numerous runs of the simulation model. 
Each single run of a computational model is an algorithmic process, the outputs of 
which could be considered deductive consequences of its inputs. However, because 
the modelling results tend to be based on a statistical analysis of numerous runs, 
they are not simply logical consequences of the modelling assumptions alone. In 
other words, the appropriate analysis of the output data, the statistical assumptions 
and the model used become an important part of the argument. Needless to say, if 
the statistical modelling of the output dataset is done incorrectly, what are reported 
as modelling results might not follow from the model’s assumptions. As an example, 
let us consider Weisberg and Muldoon’s claim that the epistemic efficiency of the 
mixed population of agents in their model is due to mavericks stimulating the 
followers to make considerable epistemic and total progress (IC3, above). A careful 
analysis of the model (see Alexander et al. 2015, Figure 8) reveals that no such 
stimulation occurs. Instead, further progress on the population level is generated 
solely by mavericks. The problem is that Weisberg and Muldoon jump to the wrong 
conclusion due to an insufficiently detailed analysis of the output data. 
Another question concerning the strength of the philosophical argument is whether 
the computational model aligns well with the conceptual model (arrows B and C in 
Figure 1). Does the implementation of the simulation line up with the conceptual 
model? Are the model results robust to changes in the implementation assumptions, 
parameters, software engineering and decisions, for example? In the Weisberg-
Muldoon case, the computational model plays a key role in establishing the mapping 
from the proportion of mavericks to the dynamics of epistemic progress. 
Computational implementations of the components of the conceptual model (the 
different kinds of agents, landscapes, epistemically significant outcomes and so on) 
are generated in the computer program. Next, the computational model is run with 
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a model structure and parameter values corresponding to different scenarios 
formulated in terms of the conceptual model. The values of the outcome variables 
(e.g., epistemic progress) are observed across these runs. Conclusions from the 
modelling stated on the level of the conceptual model rely on the input-output 
mapping of the computational model: it is with the help of a computer program that 
the modeler establishes which conceptual-model conclusions follow from which 
assumptions. Hence, claims concerning the implications of the conceptual model 
depend on the computer program and its ability to serve the inferential role 
attributed to it. In the case of the Weisberg-Muldoon model there is, in fact, a 
discrepancy between the description of the follower rule in the conceptual model 
and its computational implementation, which compromises conclusions about the 
relative epistemic performance of different kinds of agents (Alexander et al. 2015; 
Pöyhönen 2017). The argument from the premises of the conceptual model to its 
conclusions is not valid because a sequence of inferential steps implemented in the 
computational model fails.7  
Let us now look at the next argumentative step (arrow D in Figure 1), moving from 
the conceptual model to philosophical conclusions of interest. To establish that the 
modelling results alone are not sufficient for making the inferential transition, let us 
consider, for example, the different conceptual-model constructs used by the 
authors to capture the idea of epistemic efficiency: they use three distinct outcome 
measures to track the epistemic efficiency of a population of scientists. First, they 
keep track of how long it takes the population to find the two peaks of the landscape. 
Second, they define a measure they call epistemic progress as the proportion of non-
zero patches visited at a particular time. Finally, they also keep track of the 
proportion of all patches visited by some member population, which they label total 
progress. By providing counterexamples, Pöyhönen (2017) argues that none of these 
measures can function as an appropriate measure of epistemic efficiency, which is 
the more general philosophical idea implemented by the three variables. On the one 
hand, peaks-reached can be maximised by placing all agents in the peak patches, 
which corresponds to extremely poor epistemic coordination. Epistemic progress, 
on the other hand, is not sensitive to the elevation of a patch, and hence, especially 
on rugged landscapes, may correlate poorly with whether the two hills of epistemic 
significance have been discovered by the population. Finally, what Weisberg and 
Muldoon call “total progress” appears largely irrelevant to epistemic efficiency 
because it fails to distinguish the discovery of significant patches from the 
examination of zero-value approaches.  
Note how this problem differs from the ones discussed above. It is an issue that 
concerns the relationship between the conceptual model and the philosophical 
argument (arrows A and D in Figure 1). Even if the computational implementation 
of the constructs (e.g., epistemic progress) is adequate, the constructs themselves 
 
7  Despite the implementation error, the computational model naturally supports some 
argumentative transition, but it is not the one Weisberg and Muldoon report in their paper, 
i.e., in their conceptual model. 
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cannot serve the argumentative role assigned to them in the argumentation (i.e., to 
support conclusions C1 and C2).  
Another factor that could weaken the philosophical argument is the lack of 
robustness of modelling results. If the simulation is highly sensitive to changes in a 
parameter value or to seemingly insignificant choices in the computational 
implementation, this challenges the reliability of the general conclusions that could 
be drawn from it. In this sense concerns about the robustness of philosophical 
models (see Section 2) are justified. However, it should also be recognised that 
various aspects of a model’s robustness emerge over time as other philosopher 
modellers take on the task of analysing and using the original model. Moreover, the 
discovery of non-robust results might indicate the conditions under which a 
philosophical argument is tenable and help in discovering critical assumptions as 
well as difference makers. Thus, non-robust results could be informative in showing 
the range of conclusions that could be supported by the computational and 
conceptual model. As we argue later on (Sections 3.2 and 5), making sense of the 
positive and negative implications of non-robustness requires taking the broader 
argumentative context into account.  
Finally, the applicability of the epistemic-landscape conceptual model could also be 
challenged more generally. The extent to which the philosophical argument is 
convincing depends on the credibility of the models involved. Appraisal of the 
credibility of a model requires more than a comparison of the model with its 
intended target. For example, Sugden (2000) suggests that credibility depends on the 
logical coherence (i.e., validity) of the model as well on how well the model fits into 
our general understanding of the causal structure of the world. Credible models, 
according to Sugden, describe “how the world could be” rather than being accurate 
descriptions of particular or generalized real-world target systems.8 Concerning 
credibility, one could ask the following questions. Are the assumptions of the model 
plausible given the modelling goals and the argument of which it is a part? Are the 
construct (model world) and its dynamics (what happens in the model world), as 
well as the model results (findings), broadly consistent with our general knowledge 
of the world? Obviously, these questions are similar to those concerning 
representational adequacy discussed above. We are not suggesting that 
representational adequacy has no role to play in assessments concerning the use of 
models in philosophy. As should be obvious by now, we are arguing that 
representational adequacy must be evaluated in light of the argumentative goals and 
the broader argumentative context. Moreover, one can establish or question the 
credibility of a model without engaging in pairwise model-target comparisons, by 
way of making piecemeal assessments of the plausibility of individual assumptions 
relative to the argumentative goals, and considering how the model and the 
suggested conclusions fit what we already know about the world. As we will show, 
in the case of EL models, attempts to improve plausibility and credibility turn out 
to be another way of exploring what could be called the argumentative landscape 
 
8  On the credibility of models also see Cartwright (2009), de Donato Rodríguez & Zamora 
Bonilla (2009), Grüne-Yanoff (2009), Kuorikoski & Lehtinen (2009), Mäki (2009) and 
Sugden (2009). 
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relevant to the philosophical topic in question, i.e. the constellation of possible 
premises, conclusions and paths of reasoning connecting them. Such exploration 
results in a better understanding of the dependency between proposed variables, 
and of the conclusions that a given set of premises can support. However, to show 
this we should first discuss an important function of modelling: establishing 
difference makers.  
3.3. Difference making and robustness 
We suggested above that understanding how models function as argumentative 
devices requires making explicit the assumptions that contribute to model-
supported arguments and keeping score of how strongly they support the 
conclusion of interest. Grasping the different steps of the argumentation and the 
credibility of the models is only part of the story, however. Bringing the value-added 
of simulation models into focus requires closer attention to the kind of conclusion 
being argued for. Simulation-based philosophical arguments typically use models to 
support claims about difference-making. For example, Weisberg and Muldoon 
aimed to show in their modelling efforts that changing the proportion of mavericks 
in the population of scientists makes a difference to its epistemic performance. Later 
models in the EL tradition qualified this difference-making result in various ways. 
Thoma (2015), for example, shows that such dependency holds only when scientists 
are not too inflexible in their choice of a new research topic and not too ignorant of 
others’ work. Pöyhönen (2017) suggests that the original difference-making relation 
between cognitive diversity and epistemic performance does not hold on the kind 
of smooth landscapes studied by Weisberg and Muldoon; it is only on rugged 
landscapes that a heterogenous population of agents outperforms a homogenous 
population. Although pointing in somewhat different directions, all such results 
concern a difference-making relationship between (changes in) a modelling 
assumption, and (changes in) an outcome of interest.  
Establishing difference making goes beyond the task of establishing validity. 
Showing that a modelling assumption makes a difference to an outcome relies on 
the various ways of introducing variation into the assumptions. Analogously with 
Mill’s method of difference (Mill 1974, Book III, §2), to show that something makes 
a difference to something, one must find a pair of scenarios that are similar in all 
aspects except one, such that the difference in the input variable leads to a change 
in the output. EL modelling includes exactly this kind of reasoning. A model is run 
with different values of the independent variables of interest, and the effect of this 
variation on the dependent variable of interest is observed. A minimal condition for 
establishing such a difference-making claim is that holding other modelling 
assumptions constant, changes in the value of the independent variable should lead 
to changes in the dependent variable.9 A simple example of this is mentioned above: 
 
9  Note that in ABMs or in complexity modelling, changes in modelling assumptions are often 
not independent/additive. Changing the value of one parameter often influences how other 
parameters change outcomes, which means that their relation is nonlinear. This implies that 
for most purposes, one ought not simply change these variables one at a time. Instead, the 
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holding other things constant, Weisberg and Muldoon ran their model with different 
proportions of mavericks, and observed the resulting changes in epistemic progress 
(Weisberg and Muldoon 2009).  
Nevertheless, such minimal difference-making tends to be of little argumentative 
value because it can only support the claim of dependence under a very specific set 
of modelling assumptions. For most purposes, the relationship between two 
variables should have some generality across the variation in the variables, and 
across different values of other parameters of the model. As critics have pointed 
out, it was difficult to determine the relevance of the results achieved by Weisberg 
and Muldoon because the analysis of the original EL model did not include any 
sensitivity or robustness analysis. In other words, even if the proportion of 
mavericks makes a difference to epistemic progress under the set of parameter 
values employed by Weisberg and Muldoon, it may be that such an effect only 
occurs in this particular part of the parameter space of the model, and hence the 
difference-making relation might be highly local, even pointlike. Such locality (non-
generality) makes it questionable whether a model can be used to support more 
general conclusions.10 Establishing the generality and derivational robustness of a 
difference-making result requires showing that some parts of the model are not 
difference makers as far as the result is concerned. For example, and intuitively, 
results from EL models should not be sensitive to the size of the landscape, the 
exact position, shape and number of the hills of epistemic significance, or the order 
in which agents move during each time step. 
Establishing the irrelevance of such factors works differently in analytical and 
simulation models. In the case of analytical modelling, similar results are often 
derived under less stringent assumptions during the evolution of a modelling 
framework, leading to more general results. In agent-based modelling, however, it 
is typically not possible to eliminate modelling assumptions so as to make the results 
more general. All the details of the model must be implemented in some form in 
order to make the computational model run, thus the generality of results must be 
established by some other means. In the following section we suggest that sensitivity 
analysis, robustness analysis and the construction of model families could be 
considered argumentative modelling moves to that end. More generally, 
understanding the argumentative role of agent-based models in philosophy requires 
not only an understanding of model structure but also practices of model 
construction and use. The epistemic benefit to be derived from modelling is 
commonly realised as a consequence of several modelling attempts – rather than 
from the development of a single model (more on this in Section 5).  
 
"web of dependencies" must be charted by introducing variation that changes several things 
at once. 
10  Rosenstock et al. 2017 raise a similar concern about Zollman’s (2007) results showing that 
the structure of the epistemic network is connected to the premature convergence of 
opinions only when the payoffs of the two hypotheses are extremely close to one another 
(pA = 0.5, pB = 0.501 in the original model). 
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4. Modelling moves as argumentative moves 
We now introduce the notion of argumentative move and discuss how changes to a 
model made by later authors can be analysed as such. This will shed light on the 
process of collective exploration, which ultimately determines the argumentative 
value of a model. We will also show how changes in a model may give rise to second-
generation models that are intended to support philosophical conclusions quite 
different from the original ones.  
We define argumentative goals as the general and interim philosophical conclusions 
that a philosopher wishes to establish. Such goals are not always explicitly stated, 
and they may be presented partially or in a vague manner. It could be that the aims 
of the argumentation are so clear from the context that there is no need to articulate 
them explicitly. In any case, for the purposes of analysis it is useful to try to articulate 
such argumentative goals. We do not presume that a philosopher first chooses the 
argumentative goal and then proceeds to the details of the argument. He or she may, 
for example, explore a model and discover a goal that can be furthered by using, 
modifying and applying it. In this paper, we use the notion of an argumentative goal 
to reconstruct the product, not to hypothesise about the process by which it was 
reached.  
Argumentative moves are what philosophers do to reach argumentative goals, given the 
context of existing arguments. Such moves include criticism of and amendments to 
existing arguments, as well as the introduction of new ones.11 They may, for 
example, seek to: 
a) demonstrate the possibility or impossibility of something;  
b)  introduce a new idea or consideration into the debate;  
c)  examine and hence establish or challenge the validity, generality or scope 
of an earlier argument;  
d)  support or undermine earlier claims about difference-making;  
e)  modify an earlier argument to correct mistakes or to make it more 
plausible;  
f)  provide additional arguments supporting either the premises or the 
conclusions of an earlier argument;  
g)  broaden the debate by introducing a new perspective on the problem in 
question.  
We do not claim that this list is exhaustive or that the moves are exclusive 
alternatives. The list could be extended quite easily. Given that our interest lies in 
how models are used in philosophical argumentation, we focus on the 
argumentative moves that involve models. We refer to these as modelling moves.  
 
11  Making some of the argumentative moves can be conceived of as interim argumentative 
goals. Nevertheless, we wish to keep these separate to emphasise what the philosophers do 
to establish and support their arguments. 
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Modelling moves include (but are not limited to): 
(i)  modifying the assumptions of the conceptual model; 
(ii) implementing the assumptions of a conceptual model in a computational 
model;  
(iii) articulating the informal assumptions leading to the more general 
philosophical conclusion;  
(iv) introducing a novel set of assumptions and a new model. 
We have discussed several modelling moves that concern the Weisberg-Muldoon 
model and have observed, for example, how philosophers question the various steps 
in Weisberg and Muldoon’s argumentation by modifying the original model and 
demonstrating its problems. A significant set of argumentative moves in the 
literature that followed the publication of the EL model contains moves that 
challenged the validity, generality and scope of their argument. The related 
modelling moves included modifying the assumptions and the parameter values in 
the computational model to examine its robustness and sensitivity. Robustness and 
sensitivity analyses could be seen as tools that help one to find one’s way around an 
existing web of arguments. Finding highly robust results, in other words conclusions 
that can be sustained on a wide variety of premises, is of course valuable. However, 
such results are rare. What the modeller often discovers is that a certain result is not 
robust to a change in premises: in other words, a new conclusion follows from a 
modified set of premises. Nonetheless, discovering a lack of robustness is valuable 
because it helps modellers learn about the argumentative landscape, and discover 
what conclusions follow from specific sets of premises. 
Although Weisberg and Muldoon’s original paper did not report on the robustness 
of their results, the work of Thoma (2015), Alexander et al. (2015) and Pöyhönen 
(2016) all contribute to such an evaluation. For example, running versions of the 
model on both three-dimensional rugged landscapes and NK landscapes provides 
robustness checks on Weisberg and Muldoon’s original claims about the usefulness 
of diversity. Alexander and co-authors, using the new NK model, show that 
cognitive diversity is not necessarily beneficial to an epistemic community, and that 
it could also do harm. Pöyhönen’s results similarly qualify Weisberg and Muldoon’s 
original claim: in an attempt to make it more precise, the author suggests that 
cognitive diversity only provides epistemic benefits on rugged landscapes, not on 
smooth ones.12 
 
12  In simulation modelling, examining the validity of models also requires dealing with the 
problem of inferential opacity (Humphreys 2004). Given that it is not possible to inspect all 
the algorithmic steps in a model run, the modeller must resort to other techniques in building 
a convincing case that modelling results do, in fact, follow from the stated assumptions. 
Using well-known submodels, unit testing, and running simpler versions of the model are 
ways of dealing with the credibility challenge in a piecemeal fashion, arguing for the reliability 
of the model by establishing the reliability of individual components. Rigorous and 
transparent data analysis on multiple levels is another way of addressing the transparency 
challenge. As mentioned in Section 3, it was through careful data analysis that Alexander and 
co-authors challenged Weisberg and Muldoon’s claim about the mechanism by which 
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The introduction of a modified or a new model does not only concern robustness 
analysis, however, and commonly serves to increase the plausibility of the 
assumptions involved in the argument chain. In addition to raising concerns about 
the generality of the modelling results, such modelling moves could also be seen as 
instances of challenging the applicability of the model or showing the limited scope 
of the argument. Such challenges typically concern the relevance of the modelling 
assumptions or the interpretation of the results. Thoma, for example, challenges 
WM’s original model by arguing against premise P5 (see Section 3.1) according to 
which scientist agents can only move within their Moore neighbourhood (2015, p. 
462), claiming that this implies an “extreme level of short sightedness and 
inflexibility among scientists” (2015, p. 462). She shows that alternative search rules 
for agents, which appear to be just as compatible with the behaviour of scientists as 
those suggested by Weisberg and Muldoon, lead to clearly different collective 
outcomes. Having made these moves, she feels able to suggest that a division of 
labour is only beneficial when scientists are not too inflexible in their choice of a 
new research topic and not too ignorant of other people’s work. In sum, Thoma not 
only shows the limitations of an existing argument, but also develops a model that 
supports a more intuitive argument:  
“The model I have presented not only supports an intuitive result 
that Weisberg and Muldoon’s could not; it is also more credible than 
Weisberg and Muldoon’s in two major ways: First, it is not 
restricted to local movement, which I have argued is implausible 
as a representation of scientific practice. Second, the explorer and 
extractor strategies are better descriptions of the behavior of 
scientists than the maverick and follower strategies, since both 
explorers and extractors avoid the mere duplication of work 
others have done. What further speaks in favor of the model is 
that a number of its implications map ccredibly [sic] onto features 
of actual scientific practice, as evidenced in the course of the 
article. For instance, on my model it turns out to be explorer-type 
behavior that needs special incentives, which seems plausible.” 
(Thoma 2015, p. 471, emphasis added) 
Alexander et al., on the other hand, show the limits of Weisberg and Muldoon’s 
model and hence the limited applicability of their conclusion by employing a more 
plausible assumption: 
“The crucial difference between the NK model just described 
and Weisberg and Muldoon’s epistemic landscape is this. 
Expressed as an NK model, Weisberg and Muldoon’s model 
assumes fitness functions are highly correlated. […] Why does 
this matter? It matters because the Weisberg and Muldoon model 
builds into the basic topology of the epistemic landscape 
correlations that make social learning advantageous. As such, we 
 
diversity increases epistemic performance. As they showed, the existence of mavericks does 
not stimulate follower performance, contrary to Weisberg and Muldoon’s assertion.  
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should not be surprised to find, in the case they consider, that 
cognitive diversity and social interactions between agents can be 
beneficial. But, as the generalization to NK landscapes shows, 
social learning is not always beneficial. Whether social learning is 
beneficial or harmful depends on the topology of the epistemic 
landscape, a point of which we know very little.” (Alexander et 
al. 2015, p. 448, emphasis added) 
Hence, argumentative moves are not limited to modelling moves that purport to 
show the flaws in an existent argument. One might also amend the model to make 
the argument more precise, or add new features in arguing for a different point. 
Alexander et al.’s model is a good example of a positive contribution that, at first 
sight, appears merely as a critical examination. The authors go on in their paper to 
derive estimates of the upper and lower bounds of sensible search time on the 
landscape. In addition to providing a starting point for their critical examination of 
the original EL model, the methods they employ also give useful insights into the 
general properties of EL model worlds.  
Similarly, the broadcasting model developed by Pöyhönen (2016) extends the EL 
framework in novel ways. The landscapes studied are dynamic, in that the epistemic 
work done by the agents alters the distribution of epistemic significance “mass” 
between the different research approaches. Consequently, it is implied that cognitive 
diversity may lead to collective epistemic benefits by bringing about beneficial 
coordination between members of the epistemic community (i.e. by modulating the 
exploration-exploitation trade-off in collective search).  
The literature published after Weisberg and Muldoon introduced their model shows 
that, despite the shortcomings of the original model, the idea of interpreting a 
research topic as a landscape and modelling scientists as agents with different 
strategies has given rise to a new and fruitful framework, and has raised a number 
of research questions that had not thus far been carefully analysed. A further 
indication of the fruitfulness of the approach is that a “second generation” of 
models has emerged since the publication of the first set of models building on the 
original EL framework (Alexander et al. 2015, Thoma 2015, Pöyhönen 2016). In 
many of these second-generation models, the EL framework is applied beyond its 
original domain to study issues such as funding allocation in science and to derive 
science-policy-relevant conclusions. The models also provide more examples of 
argumentative moves.13 
Whereas the first-generation models focused on refining and criticising the original 
Weisberg-Muldoon model, the second-generation models are modified versions of 
the original model to serve different argumentative goals. For this reason, it is 
important to pay close attention to their details and argumentative goals. For 
example, Shahar Avin's (2019) main aim is to examine the role of funding-allocation 
 
13  The boundary between first- and-second generation models is not always clear-cut. Harnagel 
(2019) is a good example, and could be interpreted as either, depending on which aspects of 
the paper are emphasised.  
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mechanisms. Deviating from the original goals of the Weisberg-Muldoon model, 
Avin primarily attempts to direct the attention of social epistemologists from 
individual motives and learning strategies to institutional arrangements. At the same 
time, he addresses a novel audience, science-policy researchers, to convince them 
that the employment of lottery mechanisms in funding allocation could lead to a 
better epistemic output. Despite the introduction of new argumentative goals, 
Alvin's argument is based on relatively modest modifications to the Weisberg-
Muldoon model. This is crucial: if one were to focus merely on the features of 
Alvin's model without paying close attention to the argumentative goals and context, 
one would easily miss the point of the exercise.    
The second-generation models developed by Balietti, Mäs and Helbing (2015) and 
Currie and Avin (2019) provide another kind of example, where the models as well 
as the argumentative goals and the conceptual premises are quite different. Just as 
Weisberg and Muldoon borrowed their argumentative device (the idea of an 
adaptive landscape and the techniques to model it) from biology and adapted it to 
serve their own purposes (Gerrits & Marks 2015), these authors transform the EL 
framework to suit their purposes.  As in the case of Balietti et al., the audiences can 
be remarkably different too. Their article was published in PLOS ONE, not a typical 
forum for social epistemology. These changes make the arguments of the second-
generation models largely independent of Weisberg and Muldoon’s argument. 
Whatever is the ultimate scholarly evaluation of Weisberg and Muldoon’s argument, 
it does not directly affect, strengthen or weaken the argumentative force of the 
second-generation models. In other words, their epistemic fates are different. As a 
consequence, the analysis of the implications of the second-generation models could 
be carried out separately from the original discussion. Nevertheless, second-
generation models might still be useful for philosophers. For example, modellers in 
philosophy could learn a lot from Balietti et al.'s methodology and carefully executed 
analysis, even though they might have difficulties in accepting their implementation 
of the idea of “ground truth.”  
The second-generation models appear to expand the space of exploration. However, 
given the combination of modified EL models and different argumentative goals, 
they also introduce new ambiguity to the interpretation of EL models. From the 
perspective of the modellers, one way to overcome this ambiguity is to make the 
argumentative steps associated with agent-based models more explicit than is 
currently the practice. Using models as black-boxes in philosophical argumentation 
and leaving many steps of the argumentation implicit often result in barriers to 
understanding. If the changes to the modelling assumptions, the argumentative 
goals and the way in which the model is used remain implicit, the nature of the 
modelling endeavor might remain obscure and lead to misunderstandings. 
Moreover, the lack of explicitness could invite skepticism as the critical audience 
often takes the lack of argumentative detail as an indicator of arrogance and 
obscurity. Finally, as new models and arguments are introduced, the contribution of 
the first-generation models may be blurred as the (possibly unrecognised) second-
generation models muddle the debate. As it is in the case of science, models in 
philosophy should not be used as black boxes in argumentation. It is crucial that the 
audience understands what goes inside the model (the relation between the 
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conceptual and the computational), how the model is used to reach the conclusions, 
and how this fits to the broader argumentative context. 
5. The model family as a unit of epistemic evaluation 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on particular argumentative goals and 
modelling moves that are to be found in articles published in the wake of Weisberg 
and Muldoon’s original paper. This helped us to highlight the role of models as 
argumentative devices. However, the narrow focus on individual modelling moves 
still keeps us from fully grasping the value and limits of models in social 
epistemology. With this focus, each argumentative move appears as a countermove 
to a previous one, whereas the ultimate raison d'être behind the use of the EL 
framework in social epistemology is an interest in cognitive diversity. To avoid being 
blindsided by individual argumentative modelling moves, one could zoom out from 
individual models and articles to see how the argumentative moves and the 
individual models relate to one another, and consider whether they – as a whole – 
serve any useful purpose in terms of understanding the role of cognitive diversity in 
science.  
Table 1. Assumptions and results of EL Models 
 (New) Assumptions Results 
Weisberg 
and 
Muldoon 
2009 
 
- Control, follower and maverick 
search rules 
- Smooth landscapes 
- Measures of epistemic efficiency: (i) 
finding peaks, (ii) epistemic progress 
and (iii) total progress  
- Division of labour: epistemic 
performance of a population increased 
when maverick agents are added to it 
- Pure population of maverick agents 
outperforms all other populations 
Thoma 
2015 
 
- Local search is not constrained to the 
Moore neighbourhood 
- Extractor and extractor search rules 
- Division of labour is only beneficial 
when scientists are not too inflexible 
in their choice of a new research topic 
and not too ignorant of others’ work 
Alexander 
et al. 2015 
 
- Swarm rule  
- Study of NK landscapes 
- Diversity can adversely affect 
epistemic efficiency 
- Swarm agents are more efficient than 
mavericks 
- Social learning only works on 
particular NK landscapes 
Pöyhönen 
2017 
 
- Broadcasting rule for social learning 
- Measuring performance as epistemic 
work  
- Rugged landscapes 
- No social learning is needed on 
smooth landscapes  
- Mixed populations fare better than 
100% maverick populations on rugged 
landscapes 
- Diversity modulates a collective 
exploration-exploitation balance 
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Table 1 summarises the assumptions and results of the first-generation EL models. 
One way of reading the table is to look at the individual models and their results. 
Unrealistic and non-robust models follow one another, and it is not clear what their 
contribution is. Alternatively, one could see the table as a summary of argumentative 
modelling moves that philosophers employ to make a point in a debate. Although 
this reading is more useful than the first one – because it pays attention to the 
argumentative context – it still does not help the reader to fully appreciate the value 
of the individual models. A third option is to zoom out from the individual models 
and focus on the table as a whole. Consequently, one can see that there is more to 
the individual contributions than serving as counterarguments to an existing model. 
We adopt the third reading and view these models as a family that helps 
philosophers to explore an argumentative landscape. The modelling efforts of 
individual philosophers could be seen as attempts to explore and chart a network of 
dependency relations between modelling assumptions and conclusions of interest.  
We argue above that each of these models helps in establishing difference makers 
within the framework defined by their assumptions. Focusing on individual models, 
however, prevents us from seeing the epistemic benefit of modelling that is realised 
as a consequence of several modelling attempts. This is because the individual 
models do not support a single strong conclusion about cognitive diversity and 
epistemic performance. In fact, each model shows what happens given its particular 
set of assumptions. In the absence of knowledge about what happens when these 
assumptions change, it is difficult to see if the results of the model have wider 
applicability. However, conceived of as a family, individual models introduce 
variation to Weisberg and Muldoon’s EL framework. In other words, as a family, 
EL models help to make visible a set of dependencies that can be established under 
a variety of related assumptions. The collection of individual argumentative 
modelling moves within the model family helps in mapping a web of dependencies 
between changes in subsets of modelling assumptions and their implications.  
Let us consider how this differs from the derivational robustness of a modelling 
result. Non-robust results are commonly considered a weakness of a model. 
However, from the family perspective they could be helpful in terms of articulating 
the scope of dependencies indicated by individual models, and thereby direct 
attention to unexplored dependencies in the modelling framework. Thus, what 
might seem to be a troubling non-robust result in an individual model could provide 
valuable information when considered in the context of a family of models. 
Introducing variation into the modelling environment could help modellers to map 
their way in an argumentative landscape, and to discover which conclusions follow 
from which sets of premises. In other words, from the family-of-models perspective 
what matters is the discovery of the variety of dependencies between premises and 
conclusions. The question at the family-of-models level is not whether the individual 
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model results are derivationally robust, but what general claims one can support on 
the basis of the available family of models.14 
Modelling in this sense could be conceived of as learning about model worlds and 
exploring an argumentative landscape. It is no surprise that modellers themselves 
often emphasise the explorative nature of a modelling endeavour. Weisberg and 
Muldoon, for example, are aware of the limitations of their model and suggest that 
the EL framework needs further exploration. They admit that their model “only 
scratch[es] the surface of what might be explored using epistemic landscape models” 
(2009, p. 249), and suggest ways in which to explore this framework: 
"Landscapes can be made more rugged, they can contain more 
information, exploration strategies can take into account more 
information, an economy of money and credit can be included, 
and so forth. Much work remains to be done in realizing these 
possibilities, all of which we believe can be built within our 
existing framework.” (2009, p. 249)  
The family-of-models perspective also fosters the realisation that variation in models 
is not limited to small changes in the respective assumptions. The models differ on 
several dimensions: central concepts (diversity, division of cognitive labour, social 
learning) are operationalised differently, different mechanisms function between 
diversity and epistemic success, and the models keep track of various outcome 
measures. It is difficult to make sense of this solely from the perspective of 
derivational robustness, because the set of EL models do not result from systematic 
derivational robustness analysis, which would require altering one assumption at a 
time. However, if the variation between these models is seen as the consequence of 
argumentative moves that serve argumentative goals, it is easier to understand why 
they differ on several dimensions. The individual modelling attempts are not only 
concerned with the robustness of one existing model. As we have pointed out, 
contributions to the literature also purport to explore what can be argued on the 
basis of a distinct set of more plausible assumptions, or what happens if new 
considerations, such as funding, are introduced into the modelling framework. For 
example, not only do Alexander et al. (2015) explore the Weisberg-Muldoon model 
to enhance understanding of the dependencies involved and to check whether the 
model is interpreted appropriately to fit the subject of the study, they also introduce 
what they think of as a more plausible model to analyse the dependencies.  
If one focuses on EL models as a cluster, without losing sight of the argumentative 
goals served by each one, it is easier to see how the particular argumentative moves 
help to identify possible dependencies among the selected set of factors. Not only 
does exploration of the EL framework enhance understanding of how individual 
models work, it also helps in reasoning about more general dependencies. In fact, 
building multiple idealised models could be helpful in terms of focusing on a limited 
 
14  We thank one of the referees of the paper for pointing out that at the family-of-models level, 
a broader notion of robustness (rather than the more stringent derivational robustness) could 
be employed. 
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set of factors at any one time, and as a strategy it helps to overcome the complexity 
of the subject matter (Weisberg 2013). In this sense, building a family of models 
could be conceived of as a collective (although not usually intentional) 
argumentative move, which helps to establish and refine a philosophical conclusion 
of interest  
Despite its flaws, the Weisberg-Muldoon model provided a new approach to a 
problem and helped an expanding community of modellers to explore different 
ways in which cognitive diversity could influence epistemic outcomes. What this 
amounts to in family-of-models terms is a network of what-ifs that matches different 
aspects of the population with different kinds of epistemic success. Even though 
the EL family does not support a “master” conclusion, it has in an incremental 
fashion enhanced understanding about the various dependencies between the 
elements of the modelled scenario.  
Note that the family-of-models perspective may lead to an epistemic evaluation of 
the model’s contribution that differs from the one drawn up by the people 
proposing it. It might turn out that the argumentative moves the modeler first had 
in mind are more limited in terms of usability than they envisioned, or even unviable, 
and a collective process of exploration might identify better and more credible 
applications of the same basic ideas. 
As we point out above, the two most common criteria indicating the epistemic value 
in models, representational adequacy and derivational robustness, ignore the 
argumentative context and hence do not suffice to shed light on how an abstract 
model contributes to a philosophical debate, or on how it helps to answer a 
philosophical question. The family-of-models perspective further supports this 
argument in implying that one cannot assess the argumentative contribution of a 
model by focusing merely on its first presentation. The argumentative force of the 
Weisberg-Muldoon model becomes clear only as the result of the collective work of 
the people who refined, criticised and explored the EL framework. The 
understanding gleaned from working with these model variants cannot be 
summarised in one model. Knowledge of model variants accumulates gradually, 
enhancing understanding of the web of dependencies among the assumptions, 
selected factors and the conclusions. 
6. Conclusions 
We have argued that models in philosophy should be seen as argumentative devices. 
As the case of EL models demonstrates, they do not necessarily have concretely 
identified targets and they are not intended to be used as accurate representations. 
Furthermore, pairwise model-target comparisons alone cannot reveal much about 
the value of a (set of) models because they omit the relevant argumentative goals 
(“what the model is used for”), the argumentative context and important details 
concerning the use of models in a philosophical argument. Analyses of models 
should include the argumentative context because their full epistemic value can only 
be perceived when their use is seen as part of argumentative exchange. 
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We have also argued that the different EL models constitute a cluster or family of 
models, each change in a model reflecting an argumentative move made by the 
modeller. Each move serves an argumentative goal: supporting or debunking an 
existing argument/conclusion, evaluating its scope, or extending an argument 
pattern into a new domain, for example. Furthermore, this model family should be 
considered as a whole if the full epistemic contribution of the models is to be 
understood: the understanding created by a family of models cannot be summarised 
in any one of them. What the study of model variants contributes is a piece-by-piece 
accumulation of knowledge about dependencies between assumptions and results. 
As the family-of-models perspective shows, the general contribution of a model can 
be better assessed after systematic variations of it have been studied. This is 
highlighted in the argumentative perspective: the simulation result is not the same 
as the argumentative conclusion that the simulation model was intended to support.  
The perspective outlined in this paper could be fruitful as a method for rationally 
reconstructing the argumentative contribution of agent-based simulations and other 
abstract models in philosophy and in science. Rather than getting stuck with the 
apparent representational inadequacies of these models, or hard-to-interpret 
authorial intentions, in this approach the attention is directed to issues that really 
matter in terms of evaluating the model’s contribution. As our reconstruction of the 
debate about EL models indicates, it is not uncommon for the model’s true value 
to be revealed only after a series of replications, modifications and extensions. 
Although the significance of the original idea cannot be denied, the full epistemic 
contribution is a collective product. 
It is notable that the approach developed in this paper is also applicable beyond 
social epistemology and philosophy. Assessment of the epistemic contribution of 
highly simplified theoretical models is also difficult in the sciences.15 Modellers in 
the sciences may have different argumentative goals from those of their 
philosophical cousins, but general ideas about the importance of the argumentative 
context, the implicit steps between the model and the intended theoretical 
conclusions, the significance of argumentative and modelling moves, and the 
contribution of the collective exploration of model variants apply in both contexts. 
The utility of a general approach such as this is especially salient when the modelling 
frameworks travel – as in the case of EL models (Gerrits & Marks 2015) – from one 
discipline to another.  
One advantage of the proposed approach is that it makes it possible to compare 
simulation models to other argumentative resources employed in philosophy. 
Thought experiments are an interesting comparison, because they are widely used 
in epistemology, and models could be considered formalised thought experiments 
(Currie & Avin 2019). In contrast to thought experiments, model development 
enables the model’s premises to be related to the conclusions in a systematic and 
rigorous way: unlike in thought experiments, the relation between assumptions and 
conclusions depends not on reader’s intuition, but on explicitly stated (and ideally 
 
15  Frigg & Nguyen (2017) provide an overview of the difficulties faced by representational 
accounts of models. 
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freely available) premises and implementation detail, and can be exposed to public 
scrutiny. 
Simulation models deserve a fair hearing, and we claim that only by adopting an 
argumentative approach such as the one outlined in this paper is it possible 
thoroughly to assess their contribution to social epistemology and philosophy in 
general. In our judgment, it is too early to say how valuable an argumentative 
resource this particular class of argumentative devices might be. In any case, the 
contribution of these models should be assessed accurately. Hyping about their 
potential could easily lead to the overestimation of their argumentative reach, which 
could produce a backlash that could undermine their serious use in later debates. 
For example, to argue that social epistemological toy models suffice to justify 
science-policy recommendations is quite premature (pace Kummerfeld & Zollman 
2015). On the other hand, those who are highly critical of models run the risk of 
missing out on many valuable contributions. Given that social epistemology, like all 
areas of philosophy, is seeking to employ strong and credible argumentative 
resources that produce both convincing and interesting conclusions, we should not be 
purists with respect to available argumentative devices. 
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